During freshman orientation, I took the opportunity (like several other nerdier members of the incoming class) to sit in on a book discussion led by a faculty member. There were a lot of interesting ones to choose from, but in the interest of keeping up with my girlfriend's profession, I ended up picking Plato's Apology. It was a good choice though. Not only did I get to check it off my list but also I was able to participate in a good discussion on the goals of a justice system.
One particular question that the professor put to us through me off guard. Why have trials? What is the purpose of having a trial?
It seemed pretty obvious to me: see if the claims of the parties match up to real world facts. Trial is the truth-seeking phase of the dispute resolution process. That's the answer I gave to the question, which she didn't like very much: I should hope that during your time in law school that you realize your conceptions are wrong.
This was initially an unsatisfactory response. Now, I'm not as naive as to think that legal systems are perfect; however, even legal systems that don't care very much about justice have a figure out if the claims are factual
phase or make up the facts
phase. Either way, facts need to be determined at some point. The purpose of a process is, roughly, what the process is intended to accomplish, which is attainable given a well-formed process and ideal conditions. Even in a just system with a just (though not omniscient) magistrate, there would need to be pre-trial and trial phases of the process. Because the magistrate is a normal human being and does not posess omniscience, it is still a requirement that an aggrieved party come forward with a petition for addressing her grievance. The magistrate then summons the respondent, hears his answer, and then determines what facts need to be discovered. At this point, the magistrate, lacking omniscience, must necessarily discover the facts in order to adjudicate the dispute. This is a trial.
After I raised these objections later in the conversation, she conceded most, but focused her attention on these questions: (1) whether there can ever be both a just and efficient trial and (2) why patently unjust systems find the need to justify their actions by making up facts. I agreed that (1) was an impossibility, so the focus shifted to (2). Those systems could just pronounce on the dispute without coming up with any facts. Does producing evidence for the unjust act add legitimacy to the regime, thus allowing it to perpetuate? Is that the only reason? Are there systems out there that don't care at all, and how have they fared in not justifying their actions?
Those final questions are hard to answer in an hour and a half, so we ended without finishing. Still, I thought that the discussion brought up good questions and provided a nice introduction for the year.
